Democratization and the Ghost of Zapata: Mexico from 1959 to 1991

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INTRODUCTION

Mexico successfully avoided democratic reform for decades,[1] but has moved recently toward a more open electoral system. The 1994 Mexican presidential election, for example, showed that significant progress had been made toward this goal.[2]

The process that led to these reforms, however, is not altogether clear. Although there are several literatures that have implications for the study of democratization in Mexico, empirical evidence for how their theories might have influenced Mexican politics is limited. In the democratization literature, some scholars argue that elite actors in society play an important, or even crucial, role in democratic transitions (Rustow 1970; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; DiPalma 1990; Karl 1990; Przeworski 1991; Karl and Schmitter 1991).[3] This type of explanation might be especially relevant to Mexico, as the importance of elites in the various social sectors is well documented (Davis 1976; Eckstein 1977; Varela 1979; Landsberger and Girisch 1979; Handelman 1979). Another explanation is found in the preconditions literature (Lipset 1959; Dahl 1971; Huntington 1991), which argues that democratization is associated with the development of economic and social factors. Some scholars have specifically studied the political culture of Mexico, and its implications for democratization, as revealed by an examination of the attitudes of its citizens (Almond and Verba 1963; Fagen and Tuohy 1972; Booth and Seligson 1984).

The latter approach understands that Mexico has followed a very different path than the other nations of Latin America, where democratization is generally characterized as cyclical. Pastor (1989, 5), for example, found that in Latin America "contemporary

consciousness has been shaped by three swings of the pendulum since the Second World War." Malloy and Seligson (1987, 236) noted that "predominant pattern is cyclical, with alternating democratic and authoritarian 'moments.'" The twentieth century experience of Mexico, however, is one of relative stability following the Revolution. Bethell (1991, 321) observed that "Mexico stands out as a paragon of political stability within contemporary Latin America. There have been no successful military coups since the nineteenth century and hardly any serious attempts since the Revolution of 1910-20."

This suggests that research into recent Mexican movement toward democratization must include factors particular to Mexican history or culture, rather than simply applying the lessons derived from the study of Latin America. While the lessons of democratization theorists suggest scholarly avenues of approach, they should be applied in conjunction with unique Mexican factors. This follows the Rustow (1970, 347) proposition that "the study of democratic transitions will take the political scientist deeper into history than he has commonly been willing to go."

This paper tests a specifically Mexican explanation for the recent political *apertura*. It is based on public opinion surveys taken in 1959 and 1991, thereby allowing public opinion to be compared over a thirty-two year interval. Not only are the opinions of the general public described, but regression analysis is used to examine the opinions of important demographic subgroups. Polling is now commonplace in Mexico, and a growing body of research makes use of this tool (Alduncín 1986; Median and Rodríguez 1987; Domínguez and McCann 1995; Domínguez and McCann 1996). In general, however, there have been few attempts to empirically determine how opinions change over time and what effect these changes might have on democratization.

Domínguez and McCann (1996) have undertaken this task, and this paper adopts their methodological strategy. They investigated whether the Mexican public has become more democratic in the past three decades, and were the first to compare the two polls used in this study. They carefully examined changes across time to a variety of questions,[4] and

found that, "Despite some ambiguous responses and some residual problems, Mexicans are ready for a more democratic polity" because "the values of Mexican citizens became more consistent with the practice of democratic politics." They also went further and argued that "Mexico's slow process of democratization in the 1980s cannot be understood without reference to the change in public attitudes. Mexicans began to demand democracy...Mexican citizens have pressured elites to democratize the political regime and in so doing have become actors on the nation's public stage. The changed attitudes and behavior of Mexicans have induced elites to change their own strategies and behavior." [5]

Other temporal research, however, is based on limited data. Basáñez, (1993, 110), for example, wrote that an "examination of Mexican society seems to indicate that the gradual changes that have occurred in the infrastructure and values of Mexican society over the past fifty years are now transforming into calls for political as well as economic reform." His data from 1940, however, consisted only of demographic and infrastructural factors such as illiteracy and kilometers of roads paved. Camp (1993) investigated public opinion changes over time, but used data only as far back as 1981.

This paper, by contrast, adopts the Domínguez and McCann (1996) strategy, which allows us to draw conclusions that would not be possible if only one time period were analyzed. As Rustow (1970, 347) argued, "The 'advent' of democracy must not, of course, be understood as occurring in a single year - one generation is probably the minimum time of transition."

This paper finds evidence for a class-based explanation for democratization that is rooted in the memory of specific events in twentieth century Mexican history. The data show that over a thirty-two year period, members of higher socio-economic groups lost their fear of the consequences of opposition party governance. In light of the long-standing Mexican fear of instability, born out of the violence and chaos of the revolution and the successful attempt to institutionalize stability through the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), this paper argues that this attitudinal change has played an

important role in facilitating democratic reform. It does not mean that higher-status groups are now enthusiastic proponents of reform, but only that they lost a strong motivation to oppose change. They no longer fear that political change will revisit the worst aspects of the revolutionary period; the ghost of Zapata no longer haunts them. While by no means the sole explanation for democratization, this change among high resource individuals provides an important insight into political changes in Mexico.

This use of socio-economic status as an explanatory variable follows in the footsteps of the elite-actor theorists outlined above. This variable, however, is not a direct measure of political elites,[6] nor is it an explicit class measure of the type used by Booth and Seligson (1984) in their study of Mexico or Miller et al. (1995) in their study of the Ukraine. As will be discussed below, it does recognize that the opinions of some people within the general population are often more important than others, while avoiding some of the problems of the above studies. And in a hierarchical and stratified nation such as Mexico, the opinions of the comparatively well-educated and wealthy end of the socio-economic spectrum are especially critical.

THE DATA

As discussed above, despite the increase in recent years of careful survey research in Mexico, there is only limited work on how the beliefs of Mexican citizens have changed over time. There are two features of this paper that allow for the study of such a broad topic. First, the analysis is built upon two national surveys carried out in Mexico in 1959 and 1991. The second survey replicated exactly or conceptually a number of questions from the first, thereby allowing for comparisons over time. Second, logit regression analysis is used to analyze the survey data. This allows for the study of the independent effects of a variable within each year, as well as the detection of changes over time.

The first survey utilized in this study is the Mexican portion of the 1959 *Civic Culture* survey conducted by Almond and Verba (1963),[7] and the second is a 1991 nationwide poll of Mexico conducted by Gallup México.[8] A brief description of the

political and economic context of the polls is included as Appendix A, as polls taken in the midst of unusual events might not prove representative of the time periods in question.

A caveat is that some researchers believe the 1959 survey may have inaccurately sampled the Mexican population. Cornelius and Craig (1980) argued that the *Civic Culture* may have incorrectly sampled the Mexican populace by only questioning respondents in cities with populations greater than ten thousand, thus ignoring rural areas. Furthermore, they argued that some of the poorer urban districts may have been missed. They also debated how truthfully people unfamiliar with surveys respond to them in authoritarian atmospheres.

To help address these concerns I re-ran the regressions for 1991 while excluding those respondents who resided in some of the low population areas missed by the *Civic Culture* study.[9] Coefficients and standard errors for regression results based on this amended data set are shown next to those of the complete data set. Only minor differences appear between the regular and restricted 1991 data sets, and none significantly affect the overall interpretation. This provides reassurance that the 1959 data set is an adequate reflection of the population, contrary to some conventional wisdom.

As a secondary point, close scrutiny of the 1959 survey reveals that 34 percent of the respondents report having been born in a town with a population smaller than five thousand; although migrants to urban areas may well have different opinions than those who stayed behind, this at least indirectly takes some of the rural factor into account.

THE ARGUMENT

At the heart of the analysis are four questions on the possible negative consequences of a party other than the PRI assuming power. In the 1959 surveys, the questions ask if the public welfare would be seriously endangered if the opposition PAN (National Action Party)[10] or PPS (Popular Socialist Party)[11] were allowed to take over the government, while the 1991 version makes reference to the social peace and the economy.[12] These questions are critical to the success of political reform: the transfer of power is at the

heart of democracy, but citizens who believe this cannot occur without dangerous consequences are not likely to support a change in the status quo.[13]

The context of Mexican history gives these four questions a meaning they would not have in most other nations. To many respondents, a question of harming the welfare of Mexico by dislodging the PRI harkens back to the brutal chaos of the Mexican Revolution. Domínguez and McCann (1995, 35), noted that, “Asked about a future without the PRI in power, Mexicans understand that they are not being asked about the fate of a ‘mere party.’”

According to Hansen (1971, 29), Mexico during the revolutionary period “endured untold destruction. Indicative of the level of violence is the fact that between 1910 and 1921 the population of Mexico actually fell from 15.2 million to about 14.5 million. Deaths caused by the revolution probably ran well over one million, close to one out of every fifteen persons in the country.”

Camp (1993, 37) found that the revolution left “an indelible stamp on Mexican life. The Revolution touched all social classes.” Bethell (1991, 70) adds that the Revolution was “one of the most profound social upheavals to take place in twentieth-century Latin America.” The Mexican social fabric was nearly torn apart, and Johnson (1984, 73) found that “anarchy...swept across the countryside like a plague in the aftermath of the revolution.”

The Mexican political system has been specifically configured to avoid a repetition of this chaos. Camp (1993, 34) wrote that, “it is hardly an overstatement to say that political stability itself was institutionalized. The mechanism of stability assumed the form of a political party now called the...PRI.” Needler (1990, 7) explained that “the single ruling party tries to be inclusive, in part because the country has had very bitter experience of the costs of policies that lead to splits and antagonisms, in the civil war following the Revolution, and in the guerrilla warfare that grew out of President Calles' anti-clerical policies of the 1920s.”

In 1959, the date of the first survey under examination, the revolution was not merely a page in a history textbook. The Mexican government, in fact, actively promoted the remembrance of this historical event. As Fagen and Tuohy (1972, 136) wrote in their classic study of public opinion in Jalapa, "Civic authorities assiduously cultivate an image of the dire consequences that might flow from allowing class, group, and factional interests full play in public life; and both the history of the Mexican Revolution and more recent attempts to democratize the Party give bite to their warnings about the Hobbesian potential of Mexican society." As the last vestiges of revolutionary violence had not ended until a few decades earlier, there were large numbers of people alive in 1959 who had experienced this "two decades of often-brutal civil war"[14] in their youth.

We should therefore expect that if people feared that a change in the long-standing PRI regime might bring back this chaos of old, they would support the status quo. In addition, how much they feared this possibility would help determine how far they would be willing to go in opposition to change.

It is also important to point out that the current political system, despite its faults, has to date fulfilled its primary purpose: preventing a repetition of the anarchy and chaos of the revolutionary period. Craig and Cornelius (1995, 288), for example, found that "The ruling party helped to defuse class tensions...it prevented overt regional conflict." Many contemporary scholars note that at stake in reform is not just a few changes in election laws, but the possibility that society could began to unravel. Meyer (1990, 325) argued that if democratization fails, this could "mark the beginning of a political regression, leading to either more overt and repressive authoritarianism than before, or political disintegration and ungovernability." Cornelius et al. (1990, 16) noted the fear that "the more radical kinds of tinkering with the existing system could trigger severe centrifugal forces that could lead to widespread social conflict and/or the imposition of a rightist, indiscriminately repressive regime..." Whitehead (1990, 209, 212) argued that the "crisis of the regime has deepened and political hypotheses that previously seemed farfetched must now be taken seriously."

One of these is political breakdown, a “possibility [that] must certainly be taken seriously as one of Mexico’s ‘alternative political futures.’”

It is also telling that the 1994 Chiapas insurgents chose to call themselves the “Zapatista National Liberation Army,” named after the revolutionary hero Emiliano Zapata. On one level the name called to mind revolutionary ideals, such as land for peasants. On another level, it may well have been perceived as a threat to revisit the less memorable aspects of the revolution, namely the political and social disintegration that the PRI had managed to prevent for so long.

THE LOGIT[15] MODEL

This section will test if progress in democratization may be due to a shift in attitudes toward opposition governance by class. A four variable regression model has been created and will be tested in each year.

Independent Variables

In order to control for the effects of other major demographic groups, included along with the class measure are three important demographic variables that could be expected to influence political opinions: church attendance, gender and residency in the northern states.

The socio-economic status (SES) variable is an interaction term constructed from the variables measuring education and occupational status.[16] The education measure consists of four values from one to four measuring no education, grade school level, high school level, or college level. The job variable has eight values ascending from low to high status jobs. As there was a positive relationship between educational and occupational status, the status interaction variable is a clear measure of socio-economic position along two important axes.

Even if a variable dividing the respondents into specific classes was available, it might be a less effective measure. Booth and Seligson (1984) used an explicit class variable, but found that education level was a much more important explanatory factor. Other scholars have also found that education correlates with many attitudes toward democracy

(Landsberger and Gierisch 1979; Segovia 1975; Almond and Verba 1963; Domínguez and McCann 1996). Some, however, have found the class variable useful (Fagan and Tuohy 1972; Medina and Rodríguez 1987). Education in Mexico, however, is more a result of class status than a cause, so including both measures in the same variable is problematic.[17] Therefore, it is more accurate to use this two-dimension class regression than just the simple measure of education.

The class regression as used by Almond and Verba (1963) and Gallup México is based on the interviewers' opinion of the subjects' socio-economic status. The interaction term used in this paper has the advantage of being derived from the actual responses of the subjects, instead of the subjective opinions of multiple interviewers, and has more information because it includes multiple intervals instead of just a few.

There should be little doubt that those at the top of the SES spectrum are able to influence the direction of the government. Hansen (1971, 204), citing Scott's (1969) study of Almond and Verba (1963), estimated that about 10 percent of the Mexican population is able to "articulate political demands and in other ways participate actively in political life. In this stratum are found the upper-middle income groups that comprise the government bureaucracy and the upper- income segments of Mexican society prominent in the economy's private sector." Smith (1977) similarly found that while the upper end of Mexican society does not resemble a "power elite" as specifically defined by Mills (1959), those at the top share similar characteristics included in the SES variable, such as income and educational achievement. This research provides additional support for the SES variable used in this study.

Degree of church involvement was included as a control variable because religiosity may influence political views and behavior. Even though the Catholic church was formally excluded from the structure of government, it maintained a strong influence in the daily lives of many Mexicans.[18] Camp (1994, 76) found that "although church attendance alone is not the best variable for measuring the relationship between religious and political

attitudes, a statistically significant relationship between the two has been found in other studies."

Religiosity is also important because it is thought to interact with the other variables in this study. Camp (1994, 81-82) noted that religiosity is related to gender, and is also intertwined with education and geography. This points out the need for separate variables to measure accurately the isolated effect of each factor. Although another religious variable might have been better, only attendance was common to both datasets, so it was used. The variable was coded into four values ascending from one to four, measuring weekly, monthly, holiday or no church attendance.

Differences by gender are sometimes found in the study of political behavior and attitudes in comparative politics (Verba et al. 1978). Gender, however, may play a different role in Mexico than in other nations. In contrast to the women of the United States, for example, Mexican women hold more conservative opinions. Alduncín (1986, 189), for example, found in 1986 that Mexican women were uncommitted to liberation and to changing their tradition roles. More importantly, others have found that within Mexico, the attitudes of women were more authoritarian than those of men (Fagen and Tuohy 1972; Booth and Seligson 1984). In this variable, men are coded as zero, women as one.

The regional variable is a dummy dividing those living in the northern states from those living everywhere else. Scholars have found differences in political history and behavior between the North and the other regions. Historically, much of the revolutionary fighting took place in the North, and the first five revolutionary presidents of Mexico were from the northern states of Coahuila, Sonora, and Tamaulipas. In modern times, the North (along with some precincts of the Federal District) is the strongest source of support for the PAN, and the North also has the highest voting abstention rate (Nassif 1990, 95-96).[19] Camp (1994, 93) also refers to towns along the U.S.-Mexican border as more sophisticated than other Mexican cities (except the Federal District).

This variable will control for vestiges of northern regionalism that have survived into the modern era. Such differences may have even been strengthened over the thirty-two year period through proximity to the United States. Although the U.S. has not physically moved any closer, its influence has become greater because of increasing interactions of people and commerce and advances in communications technology. The northern states are coded as one, the other states as zero.

The Model

As endnote twelve shows, these questions differ somewhat in wording in each year, although they are conceptually very similar. For the regression analysis, the variables were re-coded to ensure comparability between the two data sets and to provide more intuitively meaningful numbers. The dependent variables were therefore recoded into dichotomous measures, which requires logit analysis.[20]

The model is therefore written as:

Pr(Y=1) = 1/(1+EXP(-XB)), where XB = alpha + b_1(SES Status) + b_2(Religiosity) + b_3(Gender) + b_4(North)

REGRESSION RESULTS

The crucial finding in 1959 is the strong connection between class status and fear of a breakdown in the public welfare if opposition parties took power.

Table 1

Logit Regression for "Would a PAN Victory Endanger the Public Welfare?" (1959)

Independent Variables	Coefficients (SE)
Intercept	-0.321 (0.557)

Gender	-0.629 ** (0.312)
Religion	-0.435 ** (0.206)
SES Status	0.076 ** (0.032)
North	-0.161 (0.303)
Observations	451
Log Likelihood	-215.36

Standard Errors in Parentheses

*** p<.01
** p<.05
* p<.10

Table 2

Logit Regression for "Would a PPS Victory Endanger the Public Welfare?" (1959)

Independent Variables	Coefficients (SE)
Intercept	-0.497 (0.534)
Gender	0.478 (0.268)
Religion	-0.117 (0.192)
SES Status	0.163 *** (0.035)
North	0.320 (0.265)
Observations	403

Log Likelihood	-254.57

Standard Errors in Parentheses

*** p<.01
** p<.05
* p<.10

Along with the statistical importance, the substantive impact must also be assessed. This requires first difference analysis, since the coefficients cannot be intuitively interpreted as with ordinary least squares techniques.[21]

The substantive effect varies depending on which party the survey suggests might win, with an even greater upper-class fear of the leftist PPS than the conservative PAN. The effect of moving from the lowest to the highest status in society increased fear of the consequences of a PAN victory by 24 percent and of a PPS victory by 55 percent. The converse, of course, is that lower status individuals very much believe that social chaos would not accompany opposition party governance.

By 1991, however, there is no longer a connection between social status and fear of social or economic breakdown.

Table 3

Logit Regression for "Would the Election of a non-PRI Government Cause Problems with the Social Peace?"

Independent Variables	1991	1991 Restricted

Intercept	-0.459 *** (0.141)	-0.479 *** (0.146)
Gender	-0.051 (0.135)	-0.042 (0.142)
Religion	0.004 (0.053)	0.027 (0.055)
SES Status	0.003 (0.007)	0.003 (0.007)
North	0.090 (0.132)	0.070 (0.136)
Observations	1286	1177
Log Likelihood	-864.5	-793.46

Standard Errors in Parentheses

*** p<.01
** p<.05
* p<.10

Table 4

Logit Regression for "Would the Election of a
non-PRI Government Worsen Economic Conditions?"

Independent Variables	1991	1991 Restricted
Intercept	-0.120 (0.159)	-0.111 (0.164)
Gender	-0.112 (0.155)	-0.170 (0.164)
Religion	0.121 ** (0.059)	0.137 ** (0.062)
SES Status	-0.003 (0.008)	-0.005 (0.008)
North	0.006 (0.149)	-0.026 (0.154)
Observations	1210	1114
Log Likelihood	-719.02	-660.19

Standard Errors in Parentheses

*** p<.01
** p<.05
* p<.10

The survey questions are somewhat different in this year, but they are conceptually very similar. They now ask if a party other than the PRI were to win, would the social peace or the economy be endangered. The results are clear that there is no class difference as to whether chaos will return to Mexico if the PRI loses power.

If such a fear existed among citizens in 1959, it was not purely by change. As mentioned above, the Mexican government worked hard to cultivate the fear that chaos would result if the stability of the government was threatened. Yet even by the 1970s, Fagen and Tuohy (1972, 170) found that this rhetoric was out of date. "The glories, the horrors, and perhaps even the flickering dreams of the Mexican Revolution are dead. That thirty year explosion of violence, hopes, fears, destruction, and reconstruction no longer resounds in the land." The PRI may still occasionally use this rhetoric,[22] but time may

have reduced the fear of chaos. The revolutionary ghost no longer haunts, and now other factors can be used in the decision to vote for an opposition party.

The natural question that follows is whether this attitude change is for the best. Higher classes may no longer fear the consequences of opposition governance as they once did, but they could be mistaken to do so. We also cannot rule out that this new openness is based more upon a neglect of history than a close study of the conditions of contemporary Mexico.

As mentioned earlier, concerns exists about the reliability of the 1959 data set. To assuage these doubts, tables three and four list the coefficients and standard errors for the original 1991 data set and the restricted 1991 data set that excludes respondents in towns of less than five thousand people. The results are essentially identical, which provides a greater sense of confidence about the accuracy of these findings.

One final point concerns the interpretation of the key variable. The change in the SES variable from significance in 1959 to insignificance in 1991 has been attributed to changes by the higher end of the SES spectrum. A reader may wonder if perhaps the change to insignificance is due to more agreement by the lower classes on the dangers of opposition party governance.

Such an argument, however, would go against the Dominguez and McCann (1996) finding that ordinary Mexicans have become less supportive of authoritarianism and more politicized over this time period. Figures one to four also indicate that there exists a smaller percentage of people in society with concerns about opposition party governance, which makes higher class change to tolerance the best explanation. (see Appendix B).

In 1959 the percent of respondents who could not rule out the possibility that a PAN victory might endanger the public welfare was 67 percent, and the percent similarly worried about the PPS was a higher 72 percent. By 1991, 61 percent believed there would be problems with the social peace should a non-PRI party win, and a very high 72 percent of respondents believed that a non-PRI win would either improve the economy or make no

difference. This data show that a higher 'comfort level' exists with democracy in contemporary Mexico than in the past, although the percent of people still concerned about some consequences of the transfer of power is high.

CONCLUSIONS

Making use of the Domínguez and McCann (1996) research design, this paper found an increased potential for democratization among those of higher socio-economic status. Over a thirty-two year period, higher SES status individuals are no longer more likely than their lower SES counterparts to fear the consequences of opposition party governance. In light of the long-standing Mexican fear of instability, born out of the violence and chaos of the revolution, this attitudinal change may have played an important role in facilitating democratic reform. As the twentieth century Mexican political experience has differed so greatly from the rest of Latin America, a uniquely Mexican explanation for recent openings toward democratization comes as no surprise.

This paper does not claim that this change is the only explanation for democratization, however, as other factors are certainly involved. These results also do not mean that higher status individuals are now actively working toward democracy. In fact, their contribution may be only to not oppose it to their full potential, which is nevertheless an important change in attitude. This is reminiscent of Rustow's (1970) argument that democracy in Latin America may emerge as a second-best alternative to authoritarian rule. Facing both domestic and international pressure for some movement toward democratization, the Mexican government could have chosen retrenchment and the tactics of repression, but adopted instead a more liberal path. Other researchers have suggested that various contemporary political actors and elites in Mexico desire a peaceful and democratic political outcome (Cornelius 1990; Meyer 1990), and this paper postulates that such an attitude is closely related to the more accommodating view of the alternatives to the PRI.

The evidence in this paper does not, however, tell us why this fear has lessened. If it is largely based on a fading memory of the revolutionary period, then this change of opinion may be unduly optimistic. Alternatively, it may reflect a conscious decision that social and political dynamics have changed, and that Mexico can survive (or even prosper with) opposition party rule. The important point is that in a Mexico long politically haunted by the memory of the chaos and violence of the revolutionary period, this change in opinion is likely to have had an impact on recent moves toward democratization, and will continue to shape the political future of Mexico.

[1] Richard Fagen and William Tuohy (1972, vi) argued that the "refusal to permit increased political participation and competition is recognized as necessary by many Mexican and openly welcomed by some." Knight (1990, 460) wrote that "The Mexican regime has faced demands for democratization virtually since its inception...Such movements have prompted reform (as well as repression) but never reform which transformed the fundamentals of the system."

[2]Evidence of this is that exit polls conducted after the 1994 Mexican presidential elections closely reflected official vote tallies. This not only suggests that polling in Mexico can be done credibly, but that the government allowed a relatively free election. See Ugarte (1994) and Mitofsky (1994).

[3] DiPalma (1990), for example, argued that "democratization is ultimately a matter of political crafting." He found that focusing on exogenous structural factors provides limited predictive value, and noted that crafting is particularly important in countries attempting to democratize with low levels of socioeconomic development.

[4] These questions included public attentiveness to political campaigns, willingness to talk politics, pride in Mexico and the Mexican political system, the appropriate role of the church and the military in politics, the presidential nomination system, and the preference for a strongman as leader.

[5] The four previous quotations are from pages 24, 24, 49 and 50.

[6] The study of elites in Mexico has a much more specific connotation, such as the older governmental elite of *políticos,* the younger subgroup of *téchnicos,* or even the "revolutionary family," for decades a "phenomenally cohesive ruling elite," (Ronfeldt 1990, 434).

[7] The *Civic Culture* survey was conducted in June and July of 1959, surveying 1008 Mexican respondents, weighted to 1,295 observations to better represent Mexico City.

[8] Most public opinion polls in Mexico are sponsored by a political party and are therefore often of dubious quality (see Domínguez and McCann 1995, 47, note 3). The 1991 poll, however, was financed by TELEVISA, Mexico's largest private TV network. It is one of the best available polls with which to study Mexican politics. The poll was conduced by the US Gallup Organization (Princeton, NJ) in collaboration with its Mexican affiliate, Gallup México (known as IMOP S.A.). It was conducted from July 15 to 28, 1991, carrying out a total of 3,053 personal interviews. As the 1959 poll did not take place in an election year, this poll also has the advantage of not taking place during such an event, whereas the 1988 poll did.

For a more detailed description of these two surveys, see Domínguez and McCann (1996, Appendix 2).

[9] The 1991 survey classifies respondents into five categories: one to five thousand, five to twenty thousand, twenty to one hundred thousand, one hundred thousand to one million, and one million and larger. In the regression model, I excluded those in the first category in order to create a data set more comparable with the 1959 survey. As will be shown, the results from this restricted dataset are essentially the same as those from the full dataset.

[10] The PAN (Partido de Acción Nacional) is generally considered to be a conservative opposition party with strong connections to the business community, the northern states, and the Catholic church. Its first campaign was in 1940, and it has grown into the main opposition to the PRI.

[11] The PPS (Partido Popular Socialista) was founded by a former leader of the labor sector, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, who split away from the rightward-moving PRI in the late 1940s. It was ideologically oriented toward Marxism and international communism. See Anderson and Cockcroft (1970, 303) and Taylor (1994, 742).

[12] Because the details of recoding are so important, this footnote fully explains them.

The questions for 1959 were:

1. Let me ask you about some other parties that might some day take control of the government. If the National Action Party (PAN) were to take control of the government, how likely is it that it would seriously endanger the country's welfare?

1. Probably happen
3. Might happen
5. Probably wouldn't happen

2. The next question is the same as above, except substitute PPS for PAN.

For 1991, the questions were:

3. If another party that was not the PRI came into power, do you believe that the economic conditions in Mexico would improve, stay the same, or grow worse?

1. Improve
2. Stay the same
3. Worsen

4. If another party came into power, do you believe that there would be problems with the social peace in the country, or do you believe that there would not be problems with the social peace?

1. Yes, there would be problems
2. No, there would not be problems

Question 3 was recoded so that the responses "improve" and "stay the same" were assigned the value 1, and "worse" was assigned 0. This is because neither of the former implied fear of an opposition party victory, while the latter clearly did.

In questions 1 and 2, the respondents faced a yes, no or maybe question. One must consider what a "might happen" would mean to a citizen in semi-authoritarian Mexico facing an unknown questioner. A reasonable deduction is that a "might happen" is more likely to represent a viewpoint less favorable to the government or the political system. The respondent may not fully trust the questioner, and answers "might happen" to express some dissatisfaction while not appearing seditious. On these questions I coded "might happen" into the value implying political criticism against the status quo. The "might happen" response also suggests that the respondents is open to the possibility that an opposition

party victory could lead to serious disruption. People who believe this are more likely to support the current political arrangements than take their chances with an untested new party.

The interviewees for questions 1 and 2 were also provided with a "don't know" response. These respondents were dropped from the analysis, as they were more clearly expressing uncertainty than were those who answered "might happen." On the other hand, an argument can be made that those who responded “don’t know” are open to the possibility that an opposition party victory might be dangerous, and would therefore support the status quo.

[13] The reader might ask why another survey question was not used as the dependent variable. In particular, why not the question of favoring strong leaders over laws and talk? The main reason is that the question does not involve any particular person or political party. What does it mean to favor strong leaders without any reference to who they might be or what they might do? Second, the wording of the question might imply a referendum on the Mexican presidency. This is a separate, although related, question to that of democratization. The questions of graphs one to four, on the other hand, are much less ambiguous.

To be thorough, the model was run on the strong leaders variable, showing that the higher SES individuals did not prefer strong leaders to laws and talk in both 1959 and 1991. This does not necessarily mean that they favored a fully democratic system. It just suggests that a lawless dictatorship is not to their liking.

By contrast, respondents at the lower end of the SES spectrum, *ceteris paribus*, are more likely to prefer some type of authoritarianism. What form this might actually take, however, is unclear.

[14] Domínguez and McCann (1996, 2).

[15] As footnote eighteen explains, the dependent variables seemed best coded as a dichotomous measure, which requires logit analysis. An argument could be made to divide the responses into three categories, however, and therefore use ordinal probit analysis, so I reran the regressions in this way. The results do not significantly different from those presented in this section, which adds to the confidence in the findings.

[16] An interaction term multiplies one variable against another, thus creating a new variable. For this socio-economic status variable, the higher end of the variables indicated those who are both highly educated and possess a high status job, while the lower end indicates those with neither advantage.

[17] For example,one of the issues raised by the participants in the 1966 university strikers was the increasing "aristocrazation" of higher education in Mexico. See Fagen and Cornelius (1970, 300), Segovia (1970, 312, 319), and Anonymous (1970, 324, 325).

In more recent times, most of the students at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) are still from the top income brackets. See Ruiz (1992, 428).

[18] For example, despite the fact that only civil weddings are legally valid, 70 percent of Mexicans are wed also in the church, and nine percent are married only in the church. In addition, 92 percent of the population is baptized into the Catholic church. See Riding (1985, 241).

[19] Turner (1968) also noted that citizens in the early Mexican state held strong regional loyalties and struggled for decades to achieve national loyalties.

[20] Logit analysis is the procedure used when the variable to explain takes two values. The traditional measure of statistical significance, coefficient divided by standard error, is valid just as in ordinary least squares regression (OLS). The coefficients themselves, however, cannot be

interpreted intuitively as in OLS. One way to generate intuitive statistics is through first difference analysis, where the value of the particular variable to explain is changed, while the others are held constant, usually at their means.

[21] The formula to determine first difference impacts is:

$$[1 + \exp(-X_j^b B_j - X_* B_*)]^{-1} - [1 + \exp(-X_j^a B_j - X_* B_*)].^{-1}$$

See King (1989, 107).

For ease of interpretation I will choose as the first differences values the minimum and maximum points of an independent variable, while holding the other variables to their means. Therefore we can see the maximum impact of an independent variable upon the political culture and voting behavior questions, as the first difference between any other two points in the independent variable is presumably less.

[22] *The New York Times* reported on April 21, 1997 that the PRI candidate for mayor of Mexico City has repeatedly used a radio advertisement that says in part, “It’s possible to lose everything overnight.”