By: KENNETH MAXWELL

Folha de São Paulo - Op-ed section - page A2   

When I first arrived in Spain in 1963, Francisco Franco appeared on the postage stamps with the title of "Caudillo de Espana". He was also "generalisimo" of the Spanish Armed Forces. These positions were his Franco claimed by the "gracia de Dios". After Franco's death in 1975 untangling this legacy, which had less to do with God's grace than with the brutal fact of his victory in the Spanish Civil War, was not easy.

The Spanish Army, in fact, had functioned for most of the Franco regime as an quasi occupation force; its garrisons across the country distributed more with an eye to domestic security than defending against external threats. With command structures unchanged for over thirty years, the army was top heavy with aged generals, and because personnel costs absorbed most of the military budget the army had very little modern equipment or mobility.
The old Francoist Army officers grumbled about the legalization of the Communist party in 1977, and even more about the recognition of the multi national character of the Spanish State in the 1978 Spanish Constitution which devolved substantial power to regional governments, Catalonia most significantly. These discontents culminated in a coup attempt in February 1981 when paramilitary Civil Guard and army officers took over the parliament and held the government hostage. The decisive intervention of King Juan Carlos contained the damage. But political leaders realized that the assertion of decisive and effective civilian control over the armed forces could no longer be postponed.

The Spanish ministry of defense had been established in 1977, but it remained entirely decorative. It was the Socialist government elected in 1982 that effectively imposed civilian leadership by bringing command and coordination of the armed forces under the authority of the prime minister. The joint chiefs of staff became a consultative not a command body, and a newly created chief of the general staff was made responsible for joint action by the armed forces. The minister of defense took on responsible for military policy making and with power effectively in his hands it became possible to overhaul defense planning, set priorities, and radically reform and modernize force structures. Defense expenditures initially increased substantially, but it worked.

This Spanish success story would repay some close attention in Brasilia in the aftermath of the disaster in Congonhas.

KENNETH MAXWELL is a weekly op-ed columnist (every Thursday) for Folha de São Paulo, Brazil's leading newspaper.