
Democracy in Latin America
Looking Back Thinking AheadFall 2002
Deciphering Venezuela
Ana Julia Jatar
Venezuela, often described
as the region's most stable and successful democracy, is now in a political
quagmire testing the endurance and stability of its system. What have been
the forces pushing the country into crisis? How democratic is Venezuela
today?
Venezuela?s elected president, Hugo Chávez, won free democratic
elections with 56 percent of the votes in December 1998 and was reelected
with 60 percent of the votes in December 2000. In spite of these unquestionable
electoral results, his popularity has been collapsing since July 2001, driving
opposition to the streets in protest against a government they consider
illegitimate. Last April 11, thousands marched to the presidential palace
demanding his resignation in a climactic development after a series of civic
protests. Late that evening, after a bloody afternoon, President Chávez?s
resignation was announced by his highest ranking general. A transitional
government was formed but was immediately rejected by the same people who
had marched the day before. They, together with Chávez followers,
considered it unconstitutional. After 48 hours, President Chávez
was back in office. And yet the crisis continues, political unrest increases,
and polarization deepens. Venezuela?s democracy confronts one of its
greatest challenges in history.
There are two basic paradigms to analyze the current political situation
in Venezuela:
Paradigm 1: the Chávez government is just another
chapter in Latin American history in which a leftist, popular president
is confronted by a selfish elite unwilling to give up its historic privileges
for the benefit of the majority.
Paradigm 2: Chávez is an authoritarian revolutionary
who is being constrained by a traditionally democratic civil society.
In other words, is the conflict being triggered by self-interested groups
cornering a popular president or is there a majority fighting to save democracy
from President Chávez?s authoritarian desires? As often happens,
reality has more nuances than any particular form of interpreting facts.
Though I think that paradigm two is a better description of what is happening
in Venezuela today, it falls short of explaining what caused Chávez?s
initial popularity and his electoral success. Therefore, if there is truth
to both positions, what happened in the process to change so dramatically
the country?s mood?
THE REVOLUTIONARY MOOD
Here is where the nuances begin. In 1998, angry and frustrated with traditional
political parties, citizens rejected everything that ?looked, sounded
or smelled? like an old politician. Venezuelans in a ?revolutionary
mood? knew what they didn?t want so Chávez based his
campaign on their anger and hate. The angrier he sounded, the higher he
went in the polls. In fact, Chávez got a negative mandate.
He was elected to eliminate traditional political parties, to eradicate
a corrupted leadership and to destroy the ancien regime. Unfortunately,
not too many people worried about what would come next.
Another less obvious cause for this revolutionary mood could be the country?s
economic performance and its political interpretation. From 1977?1998,
per capita income in Venezuela fell to 1950 levels. Corruption was seen
as the underlying cause of the economic mess, hence the attack on the political
class.
Chávez postponed the economic agenda and barged ahead with a radical
political reform. He destroyed the old leadership and changed the constitution.
The idea of electing a Constituent Assembly to give birth to a new leadership
was attractive and popular at the time. Also, since the writing of the constitution
promised to be open and participatory, transparency was not an issue then.
Through these constitutional changes, Chávez accumulated more power
than any other democratic president in the history of the country. But Venezuelans
were still in their ?revolutionary mood? so they did not worry
about the creeping dangers of the emerging authoritarianism and the lack
of checks and balances which emerged in the process.
The atmosphere began to change when President Chavez reoriented his confrontational
and autocratic attacks onto social institutions such as the Church, the
business community, the trade union movement, and the press. In addition,
his praise for socialism and Castro?s Cuba as a model for Venezuela
and his attempts to restrict private property rights left many Venezuelans
with doubts about the new regime. In other words, Chávez's downfall
began when he decided to use the blank check given to him by voters in a
?revolutionary mood? to lead a leftist revolution for which
he does not have the political support. Before going into the details of
this change, let?s take a brief look into the past.
A BIT OF HISTORY: THE SHAPING OF A DEMOCRATIC
SOCIETY
Venezuelan society is democratic to its bones. Among the rights Venezuelans
treasure most is the freedom to say what they please, to do what they want,
to choose their leaders, to protest against them and to vote when the time
comes. Venezuelans have enjoyed a democratic system since 1959 after the
fall of Perez Jimenez?s dictatorship. They have learned the advantages
of democracy through decades of actual practice. When President Chávez
offered Venezuelans a revolution similar to the Cuban ?Sea of Happiness,?
opinion polls showed a decrease in popularity resulting from his close relationship
with Castro. Instinctively Venezuelans know the trade-offs between equality
and freedom, and they cherish the latter. In different surveys in 1963,
1980, 1990 and 1999, 70 to 77 percent favor a democracy over any other system.
Venezuelans also enjoy voting. Although abstention levels have been increasing
in recent presidential elections, only between 7 percent and 18 percent
of eligible voters stayed away from the polls from 1958 to 1988. Venezuelans
enjoyed more than twenty years of stable and effective democracy, with the
biggest political parties in Latin America and the largest electoral participation.
Between 1958 and 1981 important social reforms were made while the economy
grew about six percent yearly.
In 1958, Venezuelan elites and political parties first banded together to
consolidate democratic institutions and avoid further military intervention.
For the sake of democracy, political parties developed pacts and agreements
to respect each other?s differences, adhere to the will of the voters
and ensure inter-party consultation on relevant matters.
However, the left was shut out of these pacts and agreements. Some have
argued that party leaders excluded the left in order to reassure elements
in business, the church, and the military who feared communist uprisings
in Venezuela. The core agreements? all political in nature?supported
channeling citizen participation through democratic means. The left and
President Rómulo Betancourt?s government often clashed over
what constituted ?legitimate political means? in democracy.
By excluding the communists, the two mainstream political parties?the
social democrats (AD) and the Christian democrats (COPEI)? were also
making a statement about what they considered valid democratic ideals. Betancourt?s
foreign policy also emphasized the collective defense of democracy, while
the Venezuelan left was less open to negotiation, believing that a Cuban-style
revolution was possible in Venezuela. After 1960, the left moved towards
violent insurrection.
In the 1970s President Rafael Caldera reopened channels of institutional
participation for leftist parties and encouraged a national dialogue, dubbed
the movimiento de pacificación?pacifying movement?oriented
towards incorporating guerrillas into the democratic game. While in the
rest of Latin America, the left was crushed by right wing dictators, the
democratized Venezuelan left began to widen its influence inside the country,
especially in the universities and military academies. In the early 1980s,
Hugo Chavez was one of those attending military training. By the same time,
Venezuelan democracy started to show signs of fatigue.
In the 1980s, traditional political parties failed to renew their leadership
(the constitutional rule of allowing reelection only after five years has
been blamed). Younger generations also felt shut out of the political game.
The winding down of the oil boom left frustrated Venezuelans with unfulfilled
social demands. After all, in 1981 oil tax revenues were US$2,000 per capita
(in 2002 dollars) while during the last decade it has oscillated between
US$250 and US$600. Venezuelan democracy weakened as a result of a lack of
political leadership and vision in a process of irreversibly declining oil
revenues and increasing impoverishment.
In 1992, Chávez, a paratrooper, orchestrated two military coup attempts
against democratically elected President Carlos Andrés Pérez.
The consequences of these political events signaled the end of the democratic
system created in 1959 but fortunately Venezuelans found a way out without
breaking the constitutional thread. Chávez was incarcerated only
to be offered a generous 1994 presidential pardon during the Caldera government.
In spite of having plotted against the constitutional order twice, he was
freed without any political restriction that would disqualify him from running
for office.
In 1993, the two parties together could not persuade 46 percent of the electorate
while only five years before they had attracted 92 percent of the votes.
Rafael Caldera won the presidential elections with only 32 percent of the
votes provided by ?el chiripero? (small cockroaches), an alliance
of small political organizations and civil society groups. For many, the
1993 elections signaled the end of the two-party system. In 1994, the year
Chávez left jail, more than 62 percent of Venezuelans believed that
existing political parties ?were good for nothing;? 64 percent
believed that ?political parties were essential,? but 80 percent
confessed ?no interest in politics.? The message was clear for
whoever wanted to hear it. Venezuelans wanted democracy, but were disenchanted
with traditional political parties and their leadership.
Riding on the country?s revolutionary mood in 1998, with a highly
antagonistic style and a confrontational discourse, a relatively unknown
Chávez got elected with 56.2 percent of the vote, with 36 percent
abstention. His main mandate was to provide a radical political reform including
the election of a constituent assembly to write a new constitution for the
country. According to constitutional specialists, the former 1961 constitution
needed only minor amendments to allow the needed changes, but the constituent
assembly became an end in itself. During his inauguration, Chávez
swore on what he called a ?moribund? constitution. The old constitution,
symbol of the ancien regime, had to go, and so it did.
REVOLUTIONARY EUPHORIA AND
CREEPING ILLEGITMACY
While almost everybody wanted a new constitution, not too many thought in
the destabilizing effects of a whole new set of rules and regulations. While
almost everybody wanted more political participation, not too many thought
about the problems of minority representation, electoral fatigue or illegitimacy.
Venezuelans wanted to participate and so they did. Between 1998 and 2000,
they went to the polls at least six times, four elections and two referendums.
Unfortunately, elections and referendums don?t guarantee a better
democracy; in the Venezuelan case this soon became obvious.
Let?s begin with a key element in the process that would help to explain
what happened. The Constituent Assembly was elected using a novel system.
It mixed characteristics of first-past-the-post system (FPTP) and proportional
representation in a new way. As in FPTP, seats were assigned to candidates
with the larger number of votes. However, as in proportional representation
the number of seats allocated to each state depended on the population of
each state, with electors required to vote separately for each seat in the
state. This made the voting process very confusing. In Caracas and other
populous states, voters had to choose more than twenty delegates from lists
in excess of one hundred. Also, the generalized abhorrence for political
parties gave way to the total elimination of party symbols and affiliations:
any relation between a candidate and a political party was disallowed. This
favored well-known candidates or those with ample campaign resources. Government
candidates had the advantage of financing from public funds. Moreover, the
government party alliance, ?Polo Patriótico,? distributed
a list with the identifying number of the candidates they favored, so voters
did not have to look at names but just check the numbers representing
their candidates in each electoral circumscription. These lists were
called ?Kinos? after a popular lottery game in Venezuela.
Thus, this mechanism led to a big atomization of the opposition. With only
half of the votes, the government alliance got more than 93 percent of the
seats (119 of 128). Thus, immediate and serious doubts arose about the representative
nature and legitimacy of the Constituent Assembly. Between July and December
1999, the Constituent Assembly not only wrote the new Constitution, but
also assumed legislative responsibilities, dissolving the Congress elected
in 1998. Important vacuums were left for the transitional regime. To build
a bridge between the two constitutions, the Constituent Assembly decided
to self- nominate a commission or Congresillo? to write the terms
of the transition. A new Attorney General and ?ombudsman? were
elected, as were new members of the Electoral Power. The Congresillo appointed
Supreme Court Justices, violating the conditions established in the new
Constitution.
In December 1999, the new Bolivarian Constitution of Venezuela was approved
by 71.23 percent, with 56 percent abstention. The structure of the Venezuelan
State was dramatically changed to five powers instead of three. Besides
the traditional Executive, Legislative and Judicial powers, the Electoral
and Citizen Power were created in order to deepen democracy and make it
more ?participatory.? The name of the country was changed to
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. The presidential term was extended from
five to six years with immediate reelection; the names for the Congress
and the Supreme Court were changed to National Assembly (NA) and Supreme
Tribunal of Justice (STJ) respectively. With new names and also new structures?the
NA for example would have only one chamber instead of two?the five
powers had to be elected under the new Constitution. Unfortunately, as we
have just discussed, this constitutional mandate was violated generating
doubts about the whole process.
Paradoxically, the new constitution introduced the concept of civil participation
(traditionally called participative democracy). Political participation
extended to elections, referenda, popular consultation, open town councils,
and recall elections for elected public officials, including the president.
The new Constitution even gives the Venezuelan citizens the right to rebel.
For this reason, the bias, lack of transparency and participation which
characterized the transitional period seen as a mockery to the democratic
aspirations of Venezuelans. In spite of all these justifiable doubts about
the legitimacy of the process, Chávez's popularity was still running
high, but soon the mood would change.
THE MORNING AFTER:
THE PEOPLE TAKE THE STREETS
By March 2002, opinion polls found that Chávez' popularity had fallen
to 30 percent. Accumulating violations of the constitutional order created
an increased sense of authoritarian rule and arbitrary power that would
generate a growing opposition. Without a system of checks and balances in
place, the opposition, mistrusting formal protest channels, decided to taketo
the streets. At the same time Chávez followers also went to the streets
to show support. With marches and countermarches, civil society had not
only become more politically involved, but deeply divided.
Several issues exacerbated this increased polarization: an intrusive educational
reform, a perception of rampant corruption, and the creation of the so-called
Bolivarian Circles.
The creation of these government-financed ?non-government organizations?
aroused suspicion among the opposition who believe they are paramilitary
organizations intended to defend the Bolivarian Revolution with guns. For
others the Bolivarian Circles are grass root organizations created only
to help the poor.
Another issue was the 2001 election of new authorities in the Confederation
of Venezuelan Workers (CTV), mandated by the new Constitution. However,
the candidate supported by Chávez lost and a traditional leader from
Acción Democrática got elected. Chávez, claiming fraud,
asked the Electoral Council to disallow the results of the elections while
qualifying the new CTV authorities as illegitimate and calling for the creation
of a Bolivarian Confederation of Workers. Elected CTV President, Carlos
Ortega responded ?if the president wants war, he will have it.?
In November 2001, tensions were exacerbated when Chávez, using special
powers given to him in the transitional period, approved more than 48 laws
by decree. Some of the resulting laws generated weakened property and states?
rights. Raising serious concerns about the real possibility of establishing
a socialist system, the Confederation of Chambers of Commerce (FEDECAMARAS)
immediately called for a national day of stoppage on December 10th. For
the first time in democratic history, the trade union movement and the business
associations were in agreement to back a national strike. Around 80 percent
of business did not open on December 10, 2001. More than the actual text
of the practically impossible-to-find texts of the 48 laws, what infuriated
Venezuelans was the antidemocratic manner in which they were approved. Regardless
of the content, Venezuelans had not changed the bad democracy they had before
for this one. Corruption and lack of transparency were precisely the plagues
of the past they wanted to get rid of. Now this government was bringing
them back with a vigor never seen before.
One after the other Chávez confronted all institutions: the Church,
the military, the decentralized governments and their police, increasing
opposition. In the international arena, he also developed a controversial
position. Chávez has confronted capitalism and challenged U.S. policy,
siding with guerrillas, Cuba, and Arab rogue states.
LEADING TO APRIL 11
In February, he turned his fury on the oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela
(PDVSA), one of Venezuela?s dearest symbols of meritocracy and efficiency.
He removed its board of directors to appoint more loyal and less capable
people. Immediately, PDVSA management complained and threatened with a strike,
asserting that these appointments violated an important principle: promotion
should be based on performance and not party loyalty. For the first time
in the history of the oil industry, workers supported upper management by
supporting the threatened strike. In response, the president, on April 7,
on national television, fired the protesting upper management. PDVSA retaliated
with a strike. Soon, the labor unions, the business community, the media
and the civil society decided to support the April 9 strike. The government
attempted to restrict television's ability to transmit news. When the government
television station broadcast images conveying the strike's failure, private
channels decided to break the restrictions and show what was really happening.
Around 80 percent of the businesses were closed and civil society took the
streets to back PDVSA.
The strike was a success and continued until Thursday, April 11, culminating
with a march by around one million people asking for the President?s
resignation in order to find a constitutional way out of the political crisis.
Article 350 of the new constitution grants the Venezuelan people the right
to rebel against any government or authority which violates the democratic
principles.
The march was fired upon by snipers who coldly aimed at people?s hearts
and heads. Eighteen people died and more than a hundred were injured. Chávez
ordered tanks to take to the streets. This tipped the top brass of the military
to ask the president to resign. Chávez requested a plane to leave
for Cuba, but members of the military command wanted him to stand trial
for his crimes. Business Association chief Pedro Carmona was appointed as
interim president and he dissolved all powers by decree. This led to a negative
reaction from opposition leaders and civil society who joined Chávez
supporters in their staunch rejection of Carmona?s decree. The military
also reacted and the ?institutionalist? forces (those who oppose
any violation of the constitution, including Chávez' 1992 military
coup attempts) asked Carmona to withdraw the decree and respect the constitution.
In the process, a majority of the Armed Forces opted to bring Chávez
back.
It is hard to understand what explains this turn of events. What is clear
is that the April 11 seriously questioned Chávez's legitimacy, and
he has been unable to end political instability. The opposition is adamant
about his departure and is now able to mobilize hundreds of thousands of
protesters.
In an extremely heated environment, the Supreme Justice Tribunal decided
in August against considering the military high command in violation of
the constitution during April 11th events. This has opened the door to myriad
accusations against the president for allegedly ordering the violence against
peaceful marchers. Chávez now only has a very precarious simple majority
in the National Assembly, with the moderates showing signs that they are
willing to negotiate the transition to a post-Chávez rule.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
After two decades of frustration with a political leadership unable to reverse
the economic downturn and to respond to political demands, Venezuelans?in
a revolutionary mood?elected President Hugo Chávez with a mandate
to destroy the old political system. Venezuelans went to the polls more
than ever in history, but institutions which underpinned democracy weakened.
As formal power became concentrated in the hands of President Hugo
Chávez, Venezuelans found informal mechanisms to constrain
the government.
Paradoxically, Chávez is now confronting the same revolutionary mood
that initially got him into power. He accomplished the negative agenda by
kicking the rascals out but has failed to make any dents in the reduction
of corruption or in turning the economy around, let alone progress on formalizing
democracy. It may very well be that the same revolutionary mood that got
Chávez into power would force him to step aside.
Ana Julia Jatar is a DRCLAS Visiting Scholar from Venezuela, researching the causes for the decline of the Venezuelan political system. She was a Senior Fellow at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington where she followed Venezuela and Cuba. Jatar authors a regular column in the Venezuelan newspaper El Nacional and hosts a radio show from Boston on Latin American policy issues.