Chile
A Changing CountrySpring 2004
An Identity in the World
Not Just an IslandMarcelo Junemann, Juan Walker and Hernán Passalacqua
On March 4, 2004, Chilean Army Lieutenant General Mario Messen received a gust of heat on arriving at Touissant L’ Ouverture Airport in Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Under his command the first 120 of 340 soldiers that Chile will be sending to maintain peace and order in this tension-filled country arrived on Haitian soil. Once again, this South American country is going its own way, contrary to what its neighbors have to say.
The sending of troops to Haiti, which stirred strong internal political debate in Santiago, marked another instance of the independence that has characterized Chile within the region during the last three decades.
The arrival of Chilean soldiers to the Caribbean island also carries a symbolic burden, and that is in the way the northern hemisphere sees Chile. Santiago accepted the proposal of intervening in Haiti made by France and the United States to some of the nations of South America. Argentina and Brazil decided not to go, even though the sending of peace troops was approved by a unanimous decision in the United Nations Security Council in an extraordinary session on February 29th.
Is Chile an island within the continent or an isolated country? The question was present in this country’s political agenda throughout 2003 after writer Alvaro Vargas Llosa posed it in La Tercera, a Chilean newspaper. The government replies that Chile is not isolated and has merely opted for a different path than that of its neighbors.
There is some truth to this, even though some of the Chilean elitists say it with a certain superiority complex, an attitude which more than once has bothered neighboring countries. But at the same time, one must recognize that it is not a minor fact that Chile was invited to participate in a peace mission with its troops, with soldiers that come from the same Army that five years ago was under the command of ex-dictator Augusto Pinochet—an obligatory point of reference in any discussion of authoritarian regimes in Latin America— and it is not minor that Santiago was the only one accepting the proposal to go to the Caribbean.
Through history, Chile has been isolated because of its distance from the rest of the continent. Consolidation of its institutions shortly after independence also made the country apply development policies to those of its neighbors.
Even the military regime was different from the region's dictatorships. Although repressive and full of bloodshed, the regime imposed an institutional goal, changed the Constitution, and applied a market model. Despite some isolated cases, the cancer of corruption did not spread into the structure of power nor in the elite during the dictatorship or in the past 14 years of democracy. All the countries of South America, with the exceptions of Chile, Uruguay and Columbia, have seen their democratically elect presidents crumble. While it is positive that these governments have not been replaced by military regimes, the downside is the institutional mechanisms to replace them have worked properly; furthermore, many governments still stand on weak platforms and with a high degree of unpopularity.
ITS OWN WAY
Without a doubt, Chile’s unique path has resulted in great political and economic benefits, yet it has left ample gaps in social concerns such as poverty, education, health and housing. Nevertheless, the country shows remarkable progress, placing it in first place for human development in Latin America according to the most recent report from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). For statistical information, <www.ine.cl; www.minhda,cl; www.bcentral.cl and www.pnud.cl>.
If Chile can be or is the leader of the region, the truth is that anyone that pretends to lead is usually accepted. In this sense, when facing giants such as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, it is difficult to appropriate leadership.
For many of the region's nations, Chile creates a problem. Chile’s model is impossible to copy in the current conditions of most Latin American societies, unless governments are willing to face an even larger internal conflict. And this is not caused by a secret formula that only Chile controls or by a supremely gifted population compared to that of other countries: the fact is that the model entered Chile by force under authoritarian conditions and with no possibility of opposition. Now in democracy, things have become different and the same model has been improved on considerably.
Internally pressured neighboring governments, heirs to enormous social and economic conflict, struggle with Chile's progress. It is not surprising that some are asking themselves: why not us? Yet clearly, models cannot be copied; each country has its history and each society its specific nature. This does not overlook that the correct administration of a government, the responsible and efficient handling of the economy, fighting corruption and the struggle to overcome poverty should form part of the patrimony of humanity and not be exclusive to a small group of countries.
ILL WILL
Chile’s unique path has brought with it more than one problem in the region that has resulted in clear ill will. An example of this has been the dispute between Chile and Bolivia for the latter's historic maritime claim. After the fall of Gonzálo Sánchez de Losada’s government, Bolivia applied pressure for their maritime demand to be treated multilaterally rather than bilaterally, which was how Chile had proposed dealing with the situation. This initiative generated surprising support from members of the Brazilian and Argentine governments, though they stepped back after realizing that no solution would be reached without a mutual agreement between the two countries. Others, like Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, openly supported Bolivia’s position. Chavez created a serious diplomatic crisis between Santiago and Caracas by saying that he “dreamt that he bathed in a Bolivian beach.” Even though the situation has now calmed down, it has resulted in an open wound and has allowed Santiago to learn that having the nicest house on the block doesn’t necessarily help make friends, in fact, many times all it does is create neighborhood gossip.
This situation reflected the intense session that the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs held midway through December of last year, where all international strategies were drawn up for 2004. This session concluded that 2003 was an exceptional year for international achievments: the political and economic agreement with the European Union was put in effect, achieving a 15% increase in Chile’s exports to Europe; the free trade agreement with the United States was signed, probably the most emblematic achievement the country has accomplished regarding exterior commerce. The agreement has been in force since January 1, 2003 and expectations are extremely positive. Recently the South Korean Parliament ratified a Free Trade Agreement with Chile after a difficult battle with strong opposition coming from Korean farmers.. It was not all about commercial diplomacy, however: in a March 2003 meeting of the United Nations Security Council, Chile rejected the invasion of Iraq, even though at the time they were negotiating the FTA with the United States.
On the negative side, 2003 highlights the estrangement of Chile’s relations with the region. The Bolivia situation was taken as an opportunity by some countries to blame Chile for following their “own way”, especially for matters that concerned “regional loyalties.” An symbolic illustration of this was that Chile had negotiated free trade agreements on their own and not within the framework of the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), of which Chile is an associated member. As a result of this separate negotiation, Chile has noticeably lower tariffs than the South American commercial bloc.
For Chilean foreign policy, this year will be key in regaining trust and understanding from its neighbors. Having concluded the commercial agreements with the main global commercial blocs, the government knows that in the end, its future is linked to the region. However, it is a notable fact that Santiago opted to link its development with its economic opening to global commercial partners: North America, Europe and Asia. More than two thirds of the country's exports go there, and that is where almost all of the investment in Chile originates.
That Chile wants to be an actor on the international stage is probable. It has solid political and economic platforms, but it also knows its limitations: distance, a small market and a serious social weakness in which the distribution of wealth is still one of the most inequitable of the continent.
Both the government and the right-wing opposition have a common objective to become a developed country by the year 2010, according to the parameters of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), an international body that groups developed countries and to which Chile is applying to join.
The real question is not whether Chile is an island. Rather, the essential debate is what is the best option for development in a complex world—for all countries, particularly for small and distant ones. With all its deficiencies and its tragic history, one could say that Chile has managed to follow the path which has just begun to produce benefits.
Marcelo Junemann is the Publisher and Creative Director for Big magazine. Juan Walker is Editor-in-Chief of La Nación. Hernan Passalaqua is the CEO of FitzroyManagement & Development and President of the Tourism Commission of the Engineer's College and MBA Imperial College, U.K.