"Mexico lacks a strong opposition"

In an interview with REFORMA, Steven Levitsky, Director of the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University, analyzed the discontent toward ruling parties in Latin America.

Last year, Steven Levitsky made it clear that there was discontent with the ruling parties in Latin America, but he pointed out that Mexico was the exception.

"The main pattern has been an anti-establishment, anti-incumbent wave - as we would say in English - that we saw in the United States, in almost the entire region, and all over the world," he said in an interview with Grupo REFORMA ahead of his visit to Mexico this week.

"There are very few democratic governments that have been re-elected. (Nicolás) Maduro managed to be re-elected (in Venezuela), but with the most radical and blatant fraud in the modern history of Latin America."

Unlike the United States, where the Republican Party managed to seize the executive and legislative branches from the Democrats, in Mexico, Morena retained the presidency and gained a legislative majority due to a discredited opposition, Levitsky pointed out.

"It's not Morena's fault," he clarified, "the Mexican opposition is very weak, and a weak opposition is always a danger to democracy. Democracy always needs a strong opposition, and right now Mexico doesn’t have one."

What challenges will Latin America face in 2025?

First, we'll see what happens in the United States. If (President-elect) Donald Trump does half of what he has said in terms of foreign trade policy, the promise of tariffs could cause greater destruction to the Mexican economy, and if he pushes for a policy of mass deportations - they're talking about over a million people, up to 15 million - that could have a huge effect on Mexico and Central America.

Another issue is organized crime and violence - especially in Mexico and Central America, but also in Ecuador - which is not only affecting the quality of democracy and eroding the rule of law but also threatening democratic stability; we saw this in El Salvador, which ended its democratic regime mainly due to violence, and it’s threatening democracy in weak countries like Ecuador, Guatemala, and Honduras.

Organized crime and migration are transversal issues that span from the south to Mexico and reach the United States. What has been lacking for Latin American governments to combat these situations together? Because it seems they do so unilaterally...

International, transnational, or regional cooperation is always a huge challenge, it’s very difficult. Each state has its particular interests, economies of different sizes, governments with very different ideologies, left and right. Today, perhaps Colombia, Brazil, more left-wing governments could speak, but between Argentina and Brazil, they hardly speak due to ideological differences... there have also been very strong clashes between Mexico and some right-wing governments in South America.

Cooperation has always been difficult. In the modern world, the only example we really have of lasting cooperation is the European Union - which also has its limitations and political weak points.

The United States no longer has the influence or legitimacy it might have had in the 1990s when it tried to lead an economic integration, and basically failed in the 90s. Now the United States doesn’t have the will or the capacity it had in the 90s, so I believe U.S. leadership is going to disappear. Neither Brazil nor Mexico, the two largest countries in the region, have shown the will or capacity to exercise leadership in the region.

It’s unfortunate, but these are battles that each government is fighting alone.

Is there a possibility that Donald Trump’s future administration will recognize the trade advantage with Mexico, considering it wouldn’t be beneficial to stop free trade with Mexico, as it is its most important partner due to the shared border?

The hope for those of us who oppose a more protectionist U.S. policy is that the business sector convinces the Trump administration that imposing these barriers would be costly for U.S. companies themselves.

We don’t know. Trump doesn’t have a proportional policy of following expert advice, he has very personal instincts, sometimes populist, so it’s very hard to predict.

It would be foolish to impose or encourage a protectionist policy, especially toward Mexico, where there is so much dependency, so much investment from U.S. companies that produce in Mexico and depend on inputs from Mexico. The dependency of U.S. companies on free trade is so great that it would be foolish.

Also, expelling 15 million workers from the U.S. economy would be foolish. But unlike most Republican and Democratic governments, which govern in a minimally rational way, this government (Trump’s) is different, it’s very personal; the Cabinet is not made up of technocrats, professional experts, it’s more like a clown show, a farce.

I remain hopeful, but I am not certain that (Trump) will follow a rational policy. Trump has mercantilist instincts, and his main instinct is bullying, using force, power asymmetries to achieve short-term gains, without thinking about the long term and the consequences that are not immediate.

In Mexico, Morena retained the Executive and gained a majority in Congress. In the United States, the Republican Party won the Presidency and also gained a majority in Congress. To what extent could this jeopardize democracy, the balance of powers, or the rule of law?

There are several nuances. The fact that in a presidential system, one party wins the Presidency and Congress is relatively common, it’s normal, and it doesn’t have to be a threat to democracy. In Uruguay, it’s common for the party that wins the Presidency to win the majority in Congress. Many times in Costa Rica, in the past, the party that won the Presidency also won Congress. It has happened in Argentina. There are coalitions with majorities in Congress in Chile, it’s common. And also in the United States, Barack Obama won a majority in Congress. It’s fairly common, and it could be and should be normal. If the dominant parties are fully committed to the rules of the democratic game and if there is no extreme polarization, it should be normal. The parties know that in the future, they won’t have a majority, and that the other party will be in power, so they shouldn’t cross certain lines because they want to maintain a good relationship for when they’re not in power.

There are two exceptions that could pose more danger. First, if there is a situation of high polarization and/or a party is not fully committed to the rules of the democratic game, then you have problems, especially if they control all branches of government. I would say that at least in the case of the United States, the Republican Party is no longer fully committed to democracy and that Morena is also no longer fully committed to democratic rules. So giving a majority to a party that is not 100% committed to democracy is dangerous. The situation in Mexico is more dangerous because Morena basically has two-thirds, very close to a supermajority, enough to unilaterally change the Constitution, which is super dangerous.

In the United States, the Republican Party doesn’t have that majority, nor close to it, and in fact, even though they won the majority in the Senate and in the House, it’s a small majority, and there is an asymmetry, a balance of power more favorable to democracy. The Democratic Party lost, but remains strong with many possibilities of winning a majority, for example, in the House in 2026.

In Mexico, unfortunately, and this is not Morena’s fault, there is an asymmetry between Morena’s electoral power and the opposition, because PRI and PAN are very weakened, very discredited and have not managed to recover or change this in the past six years. Mexico doesn’t have a political opposition force like the Democratic Party in the United States.

In this sense, without a strong opposition, what remains for Mexico?

I am more optimistic than many analysts regarding Mexican democracy. Mexican institutions are much stronger than they were decades ago, and although the party opposition is weak, Mexico has a much more robust civil society, a much stronger middle class than 30-40 years ago, and much stronger than many countries in Latin America.

The problem is the tremendous discrediting of the center-right parties PRI and PAN, which peaked in 2018 with AMLO’s landslide election victory, and which they have not been able to recover or change.

(President Claudia) Sheinbaum does not have the charisma and political talent of AMLO, and as we have seen throughout Latin America, governing these days is difficult, and governing Mexico in the next six years will be hard, and it will cost Sheinbaum more than it cost AMLO, especially because a conflict with Trump could be disastrous for the economy. But it could benefit democracy because I think it will weaken Morena politically and electorally. We still don’t know how the relationship between Trump and Sheinbaum will turn out, but I think this could also weaken the government a little. I believe that the weakening of Morena’s government will ultimately benefit Mexican democracy, creating a healthier balance of power between the government and the opposition.

This piece  was  originally published by Diario Reforma,click here to read the original article.